This paper presents a study of the economic organization of systems of financial cooperatives (FC). The first part presents a theoretical framework rooted in principles of transaction cost economics (TCE) that seeks to explain empirical regularities observable in systems of FC worldwide. The second part is an empirical study that compares the Quebec Desjardins movement (DM) and the Ontario Credit Union system (OCU) that are both organized as networks with different degree of development. The fundaental proposition is that networks, particularly srategic networks, are a superior form of governance mechanism (over markets and mergers) for realtively wide and relevant ranges of contractual hazard and size of the institutions. Further, that strategic networks provide a susbtitute, hierarchy based, control mechanisms when size of the institution dilutes internal governance mechanisms thus discouraging subgoal pursuits and expense preferences, and possibly economizing on bounded rationality both occurring in large FC. The theory allows us to generate a set of testable hypothesis of which we highlight three: i) Over a range of small FC, differences in efficiency will be relatively small, if any. ii) Large institutions should display systematically lower efficiency that similar sized FC members of strategic networks. iii) Strategic networks should display lower variance in the size as well as in performance indicators. Throughout, empirical results are consistent with our central theoretical proposition. Oponents to networks often argued that that the benefits asociated to the vast array of financial services offered to large sectors of the population and in particular to rural communities comes at a heavy price of running an expensive bureucracy. The data suggest that, yes, the success of the DM in servicing its vast and rural clientelle comes at a price. But, even paying that price, the evidence provided by the measures of X-efficiency indicates that the DM outperforms the OCU system and that expense preferences by bureaucracies are better controled in the first..
Introduction
This paper presents a study of the economic organization of systems of f inancial cooperatives (FC). It consists of two parts. The first presents a theoretical framework rooted in principles of transaction cost economics (TCE) that seeks to explain empirical regularities observable in systems of FC worldwide. In particular, we seek to explain integration of large numbers of FC into networks that present specific features common to many countries. The second part consists of an empirical study that compares two particular systems of FC, the Quebec Desjardins movement (DM) and the Ontario Credit Union system (OCU) that are both organized as networks but whose development has reached different levels of complexity.
1
The introductory statement was extracted from the McKay report, originated Chapter 5 on the Cooperative Sector in the Background Paper No 2 ( [Report, September, 1998 ]page 111-112). This and later public statements by Finance Minister Paul Martin in the same direction are a clear evidence that organization and performance of the cooperative banking sector is an issue in Canada. A brief perusal of statistics quickly leads to the conclusion that the DM has reached a larger market share than any other provincial credit union (CU) movement. In terms of share of deposit-taking institutions assets, only Saskatchewan has a similar (but slightly lower) level of market penetration ( [Report, September, 1998 ], pp. 111). Curiously, in both the McKay Report and the Finance Minister's statement, Saskatchewan is not presented as an example to follow. Later in the report (pp. 114) the following is said: The DM is a major competitor in all financial services market in Quebec, with particular strength in retail products. ....the strength of Desjardins in Quebec, coupled with a significant share of the National Bank, makes Quebec's market quite different from the rest of Canada." Not only does the DM present the strongest market penetration (or, to use a term common in the field of microfinance, outreach) in its territory, but the range of products and services offered to the humblest of its members compare favorably to that available to well-off clients of major Canadian banks. Further, through different federations, the DM keeps a strong presence outside of Quebec. The link to other provincial movements has a strong linguistic basis. Although this implies crossing regulatory border, this does not impede the DM to provide to those institutions a set of services that often surpasses that obtained by the respective CU from its provincial CU-Centrals.
While the assessment of the relative strength of the DM in comparison with most English Canada credit unions systems is most likely correct, what is not clear is the reasons for this differences in performance. Some authors (e.g. [MacPherson, 1998] ) recognize the relative strength of the DM in Canada and attribute this strength to political and cultural factors. However, another study [Fischer, 2000] based on data for 16 cases of mature FC systems in the world provides a different explanation to the relative performance of the DM. Specifically, the argument is that the relative strength of the DM is in line with those systems of FC (concentrated mostly, but not exclusively, in Europe) that are organized around the same style of governance and regulation as the DM. An analysis of the data leads to the conclusion that there appear to be two dominant models of governance of FC worldwide, one that the author calls the federated-networks (FN), and one that he calls the atomized-competitive (AC) systems. Using Data Envelopment Analysis based measures of efficiency lead to rejection of the hypothesis of equal performance between FC systems operating under both models. FC operating under one of those models, the FN, appear to display either equal or superior (but not inferior) performance than those operating under the other. While the DM is classified among the systems that have adopted the FN model, English Canada CU operate under the AC model. The importance of this finding resides in the following: if the relative strength of the DM over English Canada CU resides in political and cultural factors, emulation will be difficult if not impossible, and the recommendation of the McKay report may well be unrealistic. However, if the differences in performance can be explained on arguments of corporate governance and regulation, both factors much easier to control than politics and culture, the recommendation may indeed make sense. The task would then be to identify the reforms in governance and regulation that would give English Canada CU the impulse to approach (or surpass) the performance of the DM, putting it at par with other movements such as Credit Agricole, Rabobank, Raiffeisen Movement, all the prime institutions in terms of market share in their respective countries. In effect, North American observers would be surprised to see that in several countries the largest institution is not some joint-stock commercial bank, but a highly integrated network of independent FC .... like in Quebec. That is, the primary financial institutions in those countries are not the rich-man's banks but -relatively speaking-the poor-man's banks! While the study provides a characterization of both models with specifics on those present in Canada and some overall measures of performance, the work remains crude. The analysis of performance and efficiency is based on system-wide measures. This is unsatisfactory. An in-depth understanding of the differences in the system must be based on a study of the differences that may be observed at the level of the individual CU and DM caisses populaires. Specifically, what is the impact of the presumed differences in the governance of the movement on the performance and behavior of the network's member institutions?
Networks of FC have shown a remarkable resiliency to and adaptability to disturbances. Most systems are in place well over half a century and show no sign of weakening. Further, with minor institutional variations they have been implemented in cultural, legal and economic conditions as varied as those found in Germany, Australia, Japan, Quebec, Brazil and Korea to mention a few. TCE theory predicts that, when disturbances are highly consequential, defection from the spirit of the contract becomes highly likely. In fact, the most consequential disturbances-e.g. system wide crisis-have had the effect of encouraging the formation of tighter networks rather than opt out of contracts explicit or implicit in the arrangements (e.g. Australia, Quebec). In this paper we focus on networks of depository type of FC, however, structures of similar characteristics and complexity exist among mutuals in other industries such as insurance cooperatives (e.g. Promutuel in Quebec); health management (e.g. Statutory Health Insurance mutuals in Germany); community banks (Cajasin Spain and Sparkassenin Germany, respectively the largestinstitution, taken as networks, in their respective countries) to mention just a few. The interest of understanding these structures thus transcends vastly the field of cooperative depository institutions.
In the empirical portion of the work we compare two systems of FC that, while both organized as networks, have chosen two paths that differ by the complexity and functionality of the hierarchical governance structure they have adopted. The two models of network organization will be called the consensualand strategictypes using a nomenclature that is close to the one proposed elsewhere [Greve, 2002] . The systems we compare are: the OCU movement as a consensual network, and the DM as a strategic network. We do this by focusing on X-efficiency (EFF) based on a Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). The central proposition we test is whether governance structures that result from assuming one or the other approach to network governance, matters in terms of performance measured as EFF. In this sense, this study is similar to earlier works ( [Ingham, 1992] , [Armour and Teece, 1978] and [Steer and Cable, 1978] ) that test the hypothesis that the organizational structure of hierarchical firms -the U-form vs. M-form [Williamson, 1975] -matters in terms of performance. Two important differences between those studies and the present are the following: i) In those studies the focus is hierarchical firms of consolidated joint-stock ownership and residual property rights, that have assumed alternative governance structure for the purpose of economizing on transaction costs, while we study systems of independently owned cooperative firms that choose or not to enter into long-term network relations, also for the purpose of economizing on transaction costs;
2 ii) We use measures of efficiency that reflect modern performance analysis of financial intermediaries.
3 Throughout the paper we will denote both credit unions and caisses populaires simply as FC.
A TCE based theory of cooperative networks 2.1 Networks as a discrete organizational choice of economic organization
One important aspect of network structures that is important to emphasize is its discretenessas an organizational form.
4 Networks are one among a limited number of generic forms of organization of economic activity that includes also marketsand hierarchieson both sides of the spectrum.
5 Institutional -or governancechoices are discrete rather than on a continuous line because discrete contract law differences provide crucial support for and serve to define each generic form of governance( [Williamson, 1991] pp. 270.) and each generic form is supported and defined by a distinctive contract law. Under market, the applicable contract law is the classicalthat emphasizes discreteness of transaction, presentation of benefits to the parties and that its enforcement is assured by the courts.
6 This emphasis on discreteness and presentation of classical contract law is in full agreement with the nature of the transactions that in economics are understood under markets(as opposed to hierarchies). Hierarchies, on the other hand, are supported by the contract law of forbearance (or relational contract law). The third form, hybrids, are not a loose amalgamof markets and hierarchies but possess their own disciplined rationale. In networks -and hybrids in general-contracting is supported by neoclassical contract law.
7 Neoclassical contract law provides support to long term relationships with two key characteristics: i) the existence of gaps in the planning of responses expected from the contracting parties 8 ; and ii) the presence of a range of processes and techniques used by contract planners to create flexibility rather than leaving the gap or building in inflexibility ( [Macneil, 1978] , pp. 865). The parties to such contract maintain autonomy, but the contract is mediated by an elastic contracting mechanism. These contracting mechanisms includes arbitration, take-or-pay procurement, tied sales, agreement to agree, reciprocity, standards and regulation among others ( [Williamson, 1991] , pp. 269, [Macneil, 1978] , pp. 866-873). Reciprocity and regulation are two of the contracting mechanism used in networks of FC that we will describe later on. The principal difference between marketsand networksis the duration of the contractual relationship and the supporting contractual law (classical and neoclassical respectively) while both forms are similar in that agents conserve autonomy. Similarly, the principal difference between hierarchiesand hybrids/networksis the autonomy of the agents (being lost in one and conserved in the other) and the supporting contract law (forbearance and neoclassical respectively), while the similarity is that governance structures become necessary.
Institutional forms that are supported by one or other form of contracting laws do not appear in a continuum. Neither should it be expected that there is an infinite variation of possible generic institutional forms that will operate with similar level of efficiency, although many local -i.e. relatively minor-institutional variations may indeed be observable and likely. The importance of this notion in our analysis of strategic networks (of FC) is double: i) it serves to explain the fact that many different experiments of institutional innovation, related or independent, converge to a relatively common or genericstructures where the relationships between agents are governed by similar institutional arrangements; ii) changes in the legal and judiciary 4 Discreteness of organizations, that is also known as "discrete structural analysis" ( [Simon, 1978] , and [Arregle, Cauvin, Ghertman, Grand and Rousseau, 2000] (Ch. 2) and citation therein).
5 Markets is a form of economic organization in which individual buyers and sellers bear no dependency relation to each other. If contracts are renewed period per period , that is only because current suppliers are continuously meeting bids in the spot market. Hierarchies appear when transactions are internalized into an enterprise (the classical buy versus make options). The reader will note that we use the expression hierarchy in the very restricted sense defined by transaction costs economics given above. FN of FC are undoubtedly also hierarchies when the term is used in a wider sense as multilayered organizations.
6 A discrete transaction is one that is entirely separated not only from all other present relations but also from all past and future relations as well. Presentiation refers to the effort of identifying explictly the current value for the parties of all consequences implied by the exchange supported by the contract. A good example of presentiation is the case of an insurance contract. In a classical contract framework a purchaser of an insurance contract is deemed to have consented not only to the terms in the policy which they did not read and could not have understood if they had, but also to all the interpretations the law would make of those terms [Macneil, 1978] .
7 Neoclassical contract law and excuse doctrine apply to contracts in which the parties to the transaction maintain autonomy but are bilaterally dependent to a nontrivial degree. As noted by Macneil [Macneil, 1978] , "the long-term economic relations in question are between firms rather than within a firm". Interpreting the NSA as an interfirm rather than an intra-firm contract is in line with the (often fiercely defended) independent character and local ownership of individual FC in a network.
8 The existence of these gaps becomes more important the longer the relationship and the diversity of situations that must be covered by the contract. In a network of FC, the relationship has by definition an infinite (or not defined) duration and covers a complex set of business activities. Such contracts are bound to have considerable gaps in the planning of responses required from the parties. context may create highly consequential disturbances that may impede or facilitate the establishment of a particular generic form, or of a particular implementation, or make the implementation of such structures particularly fragile or robust.
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While the economics of buy vs. makehas been analyzed extensively, less has been written about networks/hybrids. We know that hybrid economic relations are used in situation where:
• Mergers may be too risky in view of the uncertainties of the project. In these cases networking allows to engage in reversible commitments (in this sense networks create valuable real-type options). Ex. Joint mining or technology development projects.
• Exploitation of economies of scale and scope in the production of inputs while conserving independence of the contracting parties (protection of residual property rights) is desired. Ex. Printing, banking, biotechnology.
• Providers of complementary services join in a long-term relationship to provide customers expanded value through coordination in the provision of the services. Ex. Passenger airline industry (e.g. Star and Skyteam alliances) and software.
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• Providers and users of a service that implies investment in highly specific assets (e.g. the classical case of the contractual relation between a utility producer and the distributor of the service).
In each of these case a TCE rationale can be found at the root of the formation of the network/hybrid economic relationship. The second application is the one pioneered by FC with a huge success measured by the enormous scale and complexity of some of the European networks (including Rabobank and our local version of networks that caught the eyes of the McKay Task Force: Desjardins).
Stylized facts
To analyze the economic rationale for the creation of networks of FC we must first establish a few stylized facts about FC and the networks they often form:
1. In contrast to the analysis traditionally performed in the context of TCE that has lead to the classical analysis of buy vs. make, the contractual arrangements we are focusing on do not imply a vertical relationship of provision of an input from a supplier to a buyer. In the case of FC it is a mutual lateral (horizontal) dependency that develops between the parties (individual FC: first-tier nodes). Specifically, the mutual lateral dependency arises from a pure production-economics type of imperative that consists of the need to join forces to exploit economies of scale and to reduce the uncertainty in the acquisition of inputs and the management of infrastructure required to complete the intermediation process. This feature alone, while not invalidating the analytical framework provided by TCE, does take us away from the traditional analysis which has been performed using this framework. The same type of motivation appears to be at the root of the other networks we have made reference to in the previous section. Technological alliances have been object to a similar analysis [Oxley, 1997] . As in those alliances the mutual lateral dependency between first-tier nodes arises from cooperative efforts to exploit jointly technologies, marketing, cross licencing, production and infrastructure management through: equity joint ventures, franchise arrangements and other multilateral contractual agreements.
2. Economies of scale in an obvious argument that supports the establishment of lateral dependency relations between first-tier nodes, but is not the only. In fact, uncertainty is at least an equal, and perhaps a more important agglomerating factor. Joining forces to establish a governance structure that reduces the uncertainty in the acquisition of essential inputs can be a powerful argument to establish lateral contracts. In fact, circumstantial evidence suggests that often networks that today have reached an impressive level of development, were formed to better manage uncertainty facing individual FC through organs that represented them jointly.
11
3. While TCE provides the tools to analyze the choice of governance structure (among the discrete forms: market, hybrids and hierarchies), the initial motivation of establishing a relationship between units is not one of transaction cost economizing, but one that results from production economics imperatives to exploit economies of scale and reduce uncertainty in the acquisition of inputs. To achieve this goal, individual FC could choose either mergers that would establish a hierarchy-like organization supported by relational contracts. But they can also choose a hybrid type of relationships supported by neoclassical contracts in which the parties to the transaction maintain autonomy but are bilaterally dependent to a nontrivial degree. As noted before these contracts provides support for long term relationships with two key characteristics: i) the existence of gaps in the planning of responses by the contracting parties; and ii) the presence of a range of processes and techniques used by contract planners to create flexibility ( [Macneil, 1978] , pp. 865). The units to such contract maintain autonomy, but the contract is mediated by the elastic contracting mechanism. In this choice, merge vs, networkit is transaction costs economizing arguments the ones that play the central role. The reader may perhaps believe that the choice in terms of efficiency of the contractual relationship is rather obvious (in favor of mergers). 12 This intuition derives from the fact -addressed below-that a hierarchy-like organization is likely to lead to lower production costs. However, we will have the opportunity to present arguments supporting the notion that this choice is not so obvious. Rather, for transaction economizing arguments networks are likely to be the winning choice.
4. There is thus a two-step analysis that is necessary for a comprehensive understanding of these types of organizations. The first, is the purely production economics part of the analysis that deals with the issue of achieving gains in the cost of acquisition of inputs. The second is the organization economics analysis that focuses on the type of contractual relationship that will be established between the units (the discriminating alignment).
13 From a methodological point of view, the first step can perhaps be approached using the theory of the club. This is so because a network can be viewed as a private collective (of enterprises) deriving mutual benefits from procuring and sharing common (or network) services characterized by excludable benefits, by establishing an organization with a representation governance that is empowered by the members to procure designated segments of a common services. The collective agreement that establishes the conditions of adherence to the network by the first-tier nodes, to which the collective is tied and that defines the rights and obligations of the collective will be called the network subscription agreement (NSA).
1415 However, in this definition nothing is said about the governance of this private collective. For this, TCE arguments can be used. In fact, in this work we will ignore the production economics problem and focus on the governance issue.
5. While the two problems, the production economics and the governance economics can, and should, be treated separately and using different analysis tools, they are not independent of each other. In fact, as shown ( [Riordan and Williamson, 1985] , pp. 106) they are most likely negatively related. When individual units choose to establish lateral dependency relationships, they do this with the goal of reducing production costs (through economies of scale in input acquisition and infrastructure 11 FC face relatively low output oriented uncertainty with owner/members being also the clients usually belonging to a clearly defined community. However, they face considerable levels of uncertainty on the inputs they require to provide their members with desired financial services.
12 In fact the policy oriented literature of promotion of FC is full of well intended but disinformed recommendations to do precisely that: merger to achieve economies of scale. It often do a great disservice to the FC they want to help exposing them to considerable risks of other nature. As we will see below, mergers may not be the optimal governance choice at all.
13 Note that there is yet another transaction economizing problem that arises. It is the one that must be solved to optimize the relationship between the (joint) acquirers of inputs-the hierarchy or the network-and the supplier of those inputs. This is a secondary problem that will not be analyzed in this paper.
14 In reality such a contract may exist or not explicitly. However, in absence of an explicit agreement it will be embedded in the statutes of the federative bodies as well as in other rules and regulations that govern the collective. 15 The parallell of this definition with that of a club is rather obvious. The theory of the club can potentially provide all the mathematical instruments and theorems necessary to explain the decision to join the club (the Samuelson condition), the choice of designated segment of common services and inputs, the optimal size of the network in terms of members, the size of the network facility and other second order economizing problems. This theory will however not solve the first order economizing problem of the choice of economic organization that must be adopted to govern the relationhip between the contracting parties. management). But they will do this at increasing governance cost required to manage the relation. In traditional TCE analysis, the next step, hybrids, provides middle of the road savings in production costs and middle of the road increases in governance costs; hierarchy, on the other hand will provide maximum gains in production costs but maximum governance costs. FC wanting to engage in a NSA to gain economies of scale will unambiguously face increased governance costs. Our analysis must demonstrate which choice of combination in production and governance costs is the optimal for FC.
6. If (and only if) among the options merger vs. networksthe second is a better choice, we face an additional problem. A quick perusal of the institutional forms assumed by different networks of FC in the world reveals the existence of at least two major network forms.
The first is what we will call the consensual networkswhich represent a more loose (but yet network-like) form of agglomeration and thus much closer to markets. The second is what in the -related literature of networks (e.g. [Jarrillo, 1988] ) has come to be known as strategic networkswith a high level of centralization of strategic management while keeping legal independence of ownership of the first-tier nodes. 16 This type of networks are much closer to hierarchies. The distinction parallels to some extent, but not perfectly, the difference in governance structure that exists between the U(with merger of operational and strategic decision making) and the M(with separation of both levels of decision making) forms. This distinction takes us, in fact, to the heart of the empirical analysis that follows. Quebec is a case of strategic networkwhile Ontario (and the United States) is a case of consensual networks.
Discriminating alignment:Contractual hazards in cooperative organizations
In the archetypal problem of vertical integration the focus of transaction cost analysis is on mitigation of hold-upproblems associated with investment in specific assets.
17 However, this asset specificity condition is only one example of a more general class of contractual hazards which may take many forms. One particular form of hazard that has become accepted in the literature is appropriability hazard. This hazard arises in situations of interfirm alliances that involve technology transfers and common production of goods and services in the presence of weak property rights ( [Hagedoorn, 1993] , [Oxley, 1997] ). Appropriability hazard (AH) can be traced to difficulties in adequately specifying payoff-relevant activities, monitoring the execution of prescribed activities, and/or enforcing contracts through the courts [Oxley, 1997] . When FC join, either through networks or mergers, to undertake the joint production of a designated segment of goods, member/owners of the first-tier nodes entering into the arrangement give up control of the distribution of payoffs of the joint activity, while protection of these property rights through the court is near impossible given the difficulties of third-party verification. The loss of control over the distribution of payoffs increases with the intensity of the delegation of decision powers towards the alliance integration structures, reaching its highest point when a full merger of all activities is the choice of governance structure. In this case, the property rights of individual members are fully diluted into those of the new institution. Given the one member one vote principle, all that is needed to accomplish expropriation of individual property rights of members of a FC entering into a merger, is that the partner FC has a larger membership. It has been argued [Oxley, 1997] that AH increases when i) the alliances involves product or process designs-rather than when only production or marketing activities are undertaken; ii) the range of products increases; iii) a wider geographical area is covered by the alliance; iv) more firms are involved. The appropriability hazard falls when partners are involved in multiple alliances together as partners develop mutual knowledge and selectivity criteria. In the context of FC, another factor to consider is that appropriability hazard will be a positive function of the size of the institution. Small FC typically provide a narrow range of relatively low technology financial products and services. In consequence they will be subject to a relatively low level of AH.. As the institution grows in size it is likely to offer a wider range of products with increasingly complex technology incorporated into them. Further, if they merge in order to gain in economies of scale or engage in limited purpose -CUSOS-or general purpose networks with the aim procuring and sharing common (or network) services the technology component of the products and services offered is also likely to increase.
As proposed elsewhere ( [Williamson, 1996] , pp. 107) let governance costs be defined as a family of function G J = G J (k, θ) of AH, k, some shift parameters, θ, and J = {M, N, H} where M stands for market type contractual relationships supported by neoclassical contractual relations, N stands for hybrid relationships (alliances, networks, etc.) supported by neo-classical contractual relationships, and H stands for hierarchical (merger) relationships supported by relational contracts. It is also standard to assume that
H . The default low-cost governance, M, is a simple spot contract supported by classical contract law. Any other governance structure, such as an alliance or a network, N , or a full merger of partners, H, implies larger governance costs even in the absence of any contractual hazard (G J (0)), justifying the first set of inequalities. In a graph with horizontal axes representing contractual hazard, k, and vertical axes governance costs, G J , the curve corresponding to M would cross the intercept at the lowest point with N and H displaying higher intercepts.
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One shift parameter that appears to us to be of particular importance in the analysis of mutual financial intermediaries: expense preference (EP) behavior by managers. It is an established fact that managers are not neutral when it comes to the allocation of resources into different inputs used by the firm they control (Williamson, 64) . Rather, like any individual with bounded rationality and opportunist behavior, they are likely to engage in subgoal pursuit if given the opportunity. Among the possibilities of subgoal pursuit, engaging in certain expenses such as personnel and fixed assets are likely to be favored. Further, this type of subgoal pursuit can be expected to be accentuated with diffusion of ownership [Nicols, 1967] which, in the case of cooperative institutions, is positively correlated with the size of the institution. Thus, larger institutions can be expected to display increasing deviations from the cost minimizing optimum. This is due to the cooperative principle of one-member one-vote and the free riding of monitoringphenomenon. These central propositions have been adapted to the context of mutual financial intermediaries [Akella and Greenbaum, 1988] and have found unambiguous support in empirical studies [Akella and Greenbaum, 1988] . In mutuals three key features make governance less efficient and thus more prone to be beset by EP problems:
1. The one-member one-vote bars the possibility that single shareholders may take important or dominating positions that will encourage monitoring. Every member is limited, by the very nature of the cooperative form, to a control of one over the number of members in the coop;
2. Shares are not traded in secondary markets at floating prices, all shares are bought from and sold to de coop at book value.
19 This prevents markets from incorporating into prices investor appreciation about the quality of management, which in turn affects the cost of financing of the enterprise; 3. There is no market for corporate control. Control of a coop cannot be obtained by bidding for shares in either hostile or friendly takeover.
The absence of these disciplining mechanisms in FC encourages entrenchment and provides conditions for severe EP behavior. Thus governance in all forms of mutuals -including FC-is considerably weaker than in joint stock firms. As a result, in mutuals, EPs of managers is always an issue of significant consequences and governance is typically problematic. In fact, one manifestation of EPs is that managers tend to overdimension the organizations they lead beyond the optimum economic size. We will not enter into details of these propositions and their empirical support since they are well documented, but will use the results directly in our analysis. The central idea is that the deviation of cost minimizing behavior manifested as EP increases with the size of the institution. The implication is that size of institution associated to the different governance forms has consequential impact on that choice. In all those governance forms that imply the existence of large institutions, be they the form M, N or H, higher governance costs can be expected as a result of managers's EPs.
In traditional TCE analysis, as contractual hazard in the form of asset specificity increases, the optimal organizational choice changes discretely from market to hybrid to hierarchy as each of these governance forms dominates along a governance costs economizing frontier. We propose that in the case of FC, EP, viewed as a shift parameter, plays a determinant role in governance costs and choices, increasing significantly G 0 M and G 0 H . As institutions grow in contractual hazard and size, EP will accentuate, and so will contractual 18 Traditionally the graph has been used to represent on the horizontal axe asset specificity. To the extent that this variable is a particular class of contractual hazard we see no inconvenient in extending the use of the graph.
19 Except, of course, in the one in a lifetime cases of those cooperatives that choose to demutualize.
hazard associated with lateral partnerships based on classical contracts, as their low capacity to orchestrate coordinated adaptation encourages haggling and opportunistic behavior. They will thus have to decide among three choices: i) remain tied up in these inefficient contractual relations increasingly unsuitable for the level of contractual hazard; ii) lock themselves up into merger operations where appropriation hazard of member residual property rights are high, complicated by EP hazard associated with the dilution of ownership; or iii) engage themselves into alliances where protection from appropriation hazard and the exercise of EPs is limited. Accentuated governance costs associated with M and H due to EP in turn implies that hybrids -networks-will be the governance mechanism of choice over a wide range of level of appropriability hazard. As a result, systems of FC that seek to increase services to their members through pooling of resources will either adapt by adopting efficient governance mechanisms thus remaining on the governance cost economizing frontier, or pay the price of lack of adaptation with inefficient governance mechanisms. Given the established understanding about the role of EPs in organization in general and in mutual financial intermediaries in particular, it is easy to see that they will have an impact on governance costs in the case of FC that become large by means of internal growth (M ) or by mergers (H), accompanied by an increase in contractual hazard. But why should networks be useful in restraining EPs? The argument is similar to that used to explain the superiority, under certain conditions, of the M-form organization when compared with the U-form organization, a proposition that also finds empirical support. There are two reasons why networks will tend to curb EP. They are:
1. Networks, by establishing lateral partnerships supported by neoclassical contracts, implies that individual institutions remain small, however large the network -in terms of number of members-may be. Indeed, the Quebec Desjardins network has over 1000 member institutions with a total of over 5.0 million shareholder/clients. In Europe, the German Raiffeisen-Volksbank networks is composed of over 2000 individual FC that service almost 14 million member clients (and another 16 million non-member clients). The largest individual United States credit union is much larger than the largest individual Desjardins caisse populaire. Similarly, the largest Ontario credit union is larger than the largest Desjardins caisse populaire, although the DM taken together is several times the OCU movement, in an economy that is considerably smaller.
2. In (strategic) networks a separation is made between strategic decision making and tactical or operational decision making. A central node is responsible for proposing or taking strategic decisions -often subject to approval by the membership through representative governance bodies-with firsttier nodes being responsible for day-to-day operations and performance of the members of the network and the contact with the shareholder/client. The situation is thus similar to the one that justifies the existence-and superiority under specific circumstances-of the M-form organization ( [Williamson, 1996] , [Ingham, 1992] , [Armour and Teece, 1978] and [Steer and Cable, 1978] ).
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Managers of first-tier nodes are responsible before the second tier nodes -charged with strategic planning and performance appraisal-for the performance of the node they administer in terms of the satisfaction of strategic objectives and performance standards. As a result, managers of individual FC are now subject to two controls: the one emanating from the membership through the governance bodies (Board of Directors and Supervision/auditing Committees) and the one emanating from the strategic second tier bodies. In practice, every major network of FC in the developed and developing world, has a supervisory body responsible for market practices and prudential supervision of the first-tier nodes. Thus, (self)regulation is one of the key contracting mechanisms that supports the stability of networks of FC. What varies between networks is the degree of independence between the strategic nodes and these supervisory bodies. This independence is relatively high in the case of the German Raiffeisen-Volksbank network and almost non-existent in the Brazilian Sicredi network or the Korean NACF (National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation, which, despite its name, is a network of mostly FC) network. The upshot is, networks of FC -in the way they 20 We cannot ignore the possibility that for a (strategic) network to function adequately, the first-tier nodes must achieve a minimum size below which they may be unsuitable partners for the alliance. One of the reasons why this could be the case is that by being a member of the network, the range of products offered to its members may increase dramatically. Very small nodes would find it difficult to deliver to its members this vast array of products. This is perhaps the reason that is compelling some of the strategic networks (Desjardins and the German Raiffeisen-Volskbanks systems amaong others) to encourage mergers of smaller nodes when practically feasible from the geographical point of view. have been implemented almost universally-provide explicitly mechanisms to reinforce the governance of individual units and thus curb EP.
21 Thus, other things equal, FC members of networks should display lower exposure to EP. One prediction that can be drawn from this analysis is that, ceteris paribus (strategic) networks should display lower variance in the size as well as in performance indicators of FC operating in a particular market.
We have illustrated the above discussion in Figure 1 . The curves G M , G N , and G H correspond to the governance cost function for markets, networks and hierarchies respectively. In the figure we have represented two functions for those corresponding to markets (G Ms and G Mm ) and those corresponding to hierarchies (G Hs and G Hm ) with
Js . This illustrates the fact that those forms of enterprises -say joint stock firms, s-in which governance is more efficient than mutuals, m, a more rapid increase in governance costs will be observed as contractual hazard (and firm size) increases. This results in a range of contractual hazards (k s to k 0 s ) for joint stock firms over which hybrids is the preferred governance form that is considerably narrower that corresponding to mutuals (k m to k 0 m ). No doubt, EP are also an issue in networks, however for reasons exposed above it is less so than in the other two forms of corporate governance. Thus, to simplify the graph and the exposition we simply focus on incremental shift in governance costs for M and H over N. As the graph demonstrate, the result of this shift due to EP increases the domain over which the network is the optimal range of governance form. How important this shift may be, is of course an empirical question. The shift does not have to be very large to produce the effect just described. It just needs to be sufficiently large to encompass the relevant range of contractual hazards under which most FC operate. Also, whether G Hm and G N cross at all, or whether the reduction of costs of ex-post haggling between partners more than compensates for the increase in EP that may result in mergers to insure that
, are both open questions worth investigating. An interesting observation is that strategic networks -i.e. networks where the separation of strategic and operational decision making is accomplished-are neighbors of the M-form organizations, the first placed just to the left of k 0 j -the point of switch of dominance of G Nj over G Hj to the opposite-and the second just to the right ( [Williamson, 1996] , pp.. 109)
Based on this analysis, we can predict with very reasonable confidence that over ranges of contractual hazard that are very small -i.e. FC that are relatively small and unsophisticated in the services they provide to their members and do not wish to expand those services-one can expect to see institutions that remain independent or tied up in only very loose arrangement. This is the typical situation of many developing countries in which FC is an incipient sector offering only very basic financial services, which is often all the community they serve needs. The picture on the other end is less clear. However, we adventure to posit that either:
• the gains to be made in costs due to reduced ex-post haggling is insufficient to compensate for more severe EP that result from mergers, thus resulting in
Hm (k i ) for every i, which may result in G Hm and G N not crossing at all.
• contractual hazard has not been large enough to justify the step of merging networks into consolidated organizations.
The basis for making this assertion is the following. First, the reasoning, if correct, implies that over relatively large regions of contractual hazard one should observe FC joining into networks. Only as contractual hazard increase in importance should one observe that outright mergers may become a dominant choice in terms of governance cost economizing. This is a statement that is valid only for the case of FC. It is easy to describe situations that apply to other types of institutions in which the hybrid option does not dominate over any range of contractual hazard. In fact, such a situation will occur if the frequency of disturbances is large enough ( [Williamson, 1996] , pp.. 116-117). Other scenarios can easily be identified that would create the same result. Thus, the more or less obligatory passage through the form N before moving on to H is -as the dichotomy buy vs. makereveals-by no means universal. In the case of FC it is the important role of EP that makes this passage more or less obligatory. In the same vein, it might be interesting to investigate if particular systems of FC might be exposed to situations that would justify skipping N and moving on directly toḢ. Given the relative uniformity of the services provided by FC everywhere-with those organized around networks invariably providing the widest and more sophisticated range of financial services and thus being exposed to highest contractual hazard-we do not believe that this is the case. We do not know of any system of FC that has performed this transition: M to N to H. That is, we do not know of any system of FC that was once organized as a network and has chosen to consolidate operations into a single organization in which contractual support has moved from neo-classical contract law to a purely relational contractual environment with consolidation of ownership into a single entity.
Second, often FC merge into larger organizations, sometimes quite large ones. There are two possible explanations to this phenomenon. i) They are the result of pure EP behavior by aggressive managers that seek to do exactly what EP suggests, create oversized and suboptimal organizations.
22 ii) Under the cover of an apparent legally consolidated organization they have introduced rule of governance that are designed to protect members from AH vis a vis the rest of the system and that mimic neoclassical contract law. These are just networks with a gloss of hierarchy.
23 Here we can also generate some predictions: in the case of organizations that resulted from the exercise of EP, they should present governance -and overall-costs, for equal level of contractual hazard, that are superior than those operating in a network regime.
From a practical point of view it is of course unlikely that the choices of governance structure were made by this reasoning. Rather, different systems chose alternative approaches, that lead to structures 22 We could cite several cases of FC in developing countries, particularly in Latin America, that would be likely to be the result of this. With a huge social cost, most of these institutions defaulted when their cost structure exceeded their means and have since exited the market [Desrochers and Fischer, 2002] .
23 Again, we could cite exemples of such organizations in Latin America. Two of the most prominent ones are Caja Popular Mexicana and Banco Credicoop (Argentina). These institutions evolved into these structures as an adaptation to a regulatory environment that was hostile to networks of FC and thus were forced into organizational engineering that would conserve the attributes of networks while presenting an appearance of a consolidated organizations. Interestingly, these organizations could easily be "demerged" without changing fundamentally their governance structure and decission makaing practices. The reverse, merger, implies dramatic changes in the way decissions are made upsetting completely the balance of power between the dyads and the central nodes.
that today display differing levels of performance or whose historical lack of performance has lead to their extinction either by reorganization or by exit. In some countries, different groups of FC have sometimes taken different institutional approaches resulting in the coexistence of more than one organizational form. Indeed, reality is more complex than what a parsimonious model of that reality would suggest. The merger vs. networkdichotomy we propose here may become entangled. This is, for example, the case in our two case studies (Ontario and Quebec). In Ontario, FC have favored growth either by internal means or through mergers. In Quebec, over the last 50 years, FC (now unified under the Desjardins banner) have become highly integrated into a network. However, in the U.S. -and less so in Ontario-FC increasingly join in limited purposenetworks -in contrast to all purposenetworks such as Desjardins and others-known as CUSOs (Credit Union Service Organizations).
24 On the other hand, Desjardins -and other networks of FC-have, in the last few years engaged in a considerable consolidation of its structure encouraging merger activity, specially among the smallest members of the network.
25 Yet, care has been taken to discourage formation of monster-FC,to seek a balance in the size of member units and to encourage a deepening of the division of labor between member FC and the network second-tier nodes. That is, the merger activity was designed to strengthen the ties and increase efficiency within the networks. These processes result is two clearly distinguishable models of cooperative organization and governance. The Ontario credit union system, with a loose level of integration-consensual networks-with some very large institutions that result from mergers and internal growth on one hand. On the other, the Quebec Desjardins movement built a strategic network where central nodes provide a wide range of inputs, infrastructure management services, strategic leadership and monitoring functions.
Subsidiarity
A concept often used by networks of FC to regulate governance mechanisms-and that to our knowledge has no parallel in the TCE literature nor in other writings about hybrids-is the subsidiarity principle. The interest of analyzing this concept is that it has the-in TCE-rather obvious function of influencing a key aspect of governance mechanisms: increasing the power of autonomous incentives. A dictionary based definition of the term, articulated for political structures, suggests that subsidiarityis a concept that opposes centralization, that delimits the function of second tier nodes to that of supporting and complementing auto-determination of first-tier units.
26 In the Collins Concise Dictionary, the word subsidiarity is defined as the principle of devolving political decisions to the lowest practical level. This implies that the second (and higher) tier nodes have the function of assisting first-tier units in a supplementary capacity only. Higher tier nodes are not to carry out activities that may compete with the lower tier nodes or that can be performed more efficiently by these. For example, they provide services that cannot be provided by the first-tier nodes that require economies of scale or that may require skills not available in every or most first-tier nodes. The application of the principle of subsidiarity encourages decentralizations of functions in the network yielding as a result that the maximum amount possible of task are organized around first-tier nodes. According to some observers of cooperative movements [Heinke, 1993] the only fact that justifies a second tier node to assumes a particular political or business function is that the first-tier node(s) is (are) incapable of performing locally the functions necessary for the delivery of services to their members.
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24 These are joint ventures of a limited number of FC in which some specific resources are pooled and jointly used by the members of the CUSO. Examples of resources pooled under CUSO are ATMs and Common service branches. However, U.S. FC have not reached the level of network integration that characterizes Desjardins, where every FC in the system participates in a vast club of common resources and pooling of risk coupled with a sophisticated governance structure. In fact, most U.S. based FC have not joined any CUSO.
25 Leaders of the Desjardins movement have set the target of reducing the number of FC from over 1200 to below 800. 26 According to L. Mueller, President of the Bavarian Cooperative Central Bank (LZB) and cited by Reibert [Reibert, 1994] , the word "subsidiarity" derives from the word "Subsiduum" or "Subsidium" that in military science refers to reserve troops, that engage only in those occasions in which combating troops are insufficient. The principle of subsidiarity finds ideological roots in the catolic social philosophy, with an explicit formulation in the 1931 Social Encyclica Quadragesimo Anno.
27 This principle is a key feature also for political structures in which long-term alliances are formed that imply complex governance and institutional structures while the first tier units (in this case provinces and states) wish to conserve the level of autonomy that the protection of the interests of their constituency requires while promoting overall efficiency of the system. For example, the subsidiarity principle plays a central role in the European Maastricht Accord. This Accord also extends the concept of subsidiarity. There, it is specified that the second tier nodes (EEC bodies) should engage in functions that are not of their competence only in those cases in which the overall goals of the system cannot be achieved otherwise. This extension appears reasonable for networks such as those created by FC, to the extent that recalcitrant individual first-tier nodes could
The central ideas behind the principle of subsidiarity are thus the following:
• The second (and higher) tier nodes have the function of assisting or functioning in a supplementary capacity only, and this only by first-tier nodes' choice.
• Under no circumstances are higher tier organizations to carry out activities that may compete with the lower tier nodes.
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• The maximum amount possible of task are organized around the first-tier nodes.
• Second tier organs provide only services that cannot be provided by the first-tier nodes and that require economies of scale or can be produced only by the higher tier nodes.
Some particularly important examples of application of the principle of subsidiarity are the following: the abstention of second tier nodes to accept membership of-or to accept deposits from or provide credit to-natural persons; the abstention of second tier nodes to open branches or points of services that compete with the activities of the first-tier units; the abstention of second tier nodes to execute business transactions with members that are within the sphere of activities of the first-tier units.
The use of principle of subsidiarity is perhaps one of the least evident features of networks of FC. While a definition of the principle and notes about the necessity of its use are relatively easy to find, particularly in the German literature on networks of FC and Sparkassen, 29 much less is said about its specific economic role. However its consistent application can easily been explained in terms of TCE. We may attribute to the principle of subsidiarity precise economic functions:
1. Increases the overall efficiency of the network. As in the M-form, the subsidiarity principle promotes the separation of competence of first and second tier nodes with each one assuming only the function in which they are most efficient or present comparative advantages.
2. Reduces the impact of errors on the network. By keeping decision and activities at the lower levels when economies of scale or comparative advantage do not justify unambiguously their transfer to second tier nodes, errors committed in the exercise of the business activity will tend to have a local impact only, keeping the rest of the network shielded and facilitating learning.
3. Introduces an environment of competition in the network. Preventing unnecessary centralization and favoring initiatives at the local level. An environment of experimentation and competition is thus created that facilitates the rapid transmission of tried and efficient solutions across the network.
4. Limits the uncontrolled growth of second tier nodes and insures governability of the network. The principle of subsidiarity establishes a relatively clear criteria for the separation of functions between first and second tier nodes and reaffirms the accessory role of the second with respect to the first. In this context it is interesting to note the definition of subsidiarity provided by S. Battisti and cited by Reibert [Reibert, 1994] 30 According to Battisti subsidiarity is a rule of competence attribution and construction for associations and federations that serves as guide for questions of design.Subsidiarity thus provides a criteria that delimits the growth of second tier organizations encouraging their expansion when important economies can be achieved by transferring functions from first to second tier nodes or putting a break on their expansion when the subsidiarity principle is being transgressed.
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otherwise hold the entire network hostage of achieving desirable goals. However, this extension of the concept also opens the door to arbitrary centralization of power by second-tier nodes.
28 A simple but illustrating example of application of this principle is the case of the Reinsurance company owned by Promutuel. This, while specialized in reinsurance of casualty insurance liabilities, is allowed to retail casualty insurance directly to the public only in those territories where members of the Promutuel federation have no installed selling capacity, particularly the "open territories" of Montreal and Quebec City.
29 e.g. Arzbach [Arzbach, Septiembre, 2000] , Bonus et al. [Bonus, Greve, Kring and Polster, Oktober, 1999] , Reibert [Reibert, 1994] and Heinke [Heinke, 1993] .
30 The citation is from the book by Battisti, The Historical Intelectual Roots of the Subsidiarity Principle. 31 Heinke [Heinke, 1993] also defines what he calls the "active subsidiarity." Under this concept reference is made to activities second tier nodes engage to cover "seamlessly" all aspects of the market in which competition is occurring and in which first-tier units are not active or have not the competence to become active.
Clearly, the principle of subsidiarity used and invoked so often by networks of FC has clearly the role to strengthen autonomous adaptation mechanisms within the network. As often emphasized, autonomous adaptations by economic units constitute one of the market's most powerful attributes to force economic efficiency. Thus, networks clearly seek to exploit efficiently both Hayek's autonomous adaptation and Barnards cooperative adaptation mechanisms [Williamson, 1996] .
Consensual and strategic networks
Thus far we have focused on explaining why networks may be an organizational structure of choice for FC and why it is likely that systems that are organized as networks may outperform those that are not, at the individual level and globally. However, in several occasions we have made reference to the fact that even among networks of FC there exist sometimes important differences in the level of integration. We used the expression consensualand strategicnetworks to describe respectively the OCU system and the DM. This distinction results from the imperative to explain two systems that, evidently engaged in considerable level of lateral relations, present critical differences. These differences have already been noted and described ( [Greve, 2002] , [Polster, 2001] ).
32 While many features of networks noted above are common to both forms of networks authors note a few key differences that modify considerably the dynamics of the functioning of the respective forms of organization. The main difference between the two forms of networks appear mostly in the representation governance.
• Consensual networks consist predominantly of collections of multilateral agreements between first-tier nodes. They operate on the basis of continued consensus of all or a subset of participants of the collective. Members of the collective remain free to opt out of the use of some of the network services either not offering the service, producing it locally or outsourcing with extra network institutions.
There is no majority vote on strategic issues that compromise the residual rights of member/owners of the node. Reciprocity is the dominant mechanism for contract enforcement.
• In strategic networks decisions taken by the collective according to established decision rules become mandatory for the entire collective. This decision process is usually operationalized through the cession by the collective to the representation governance some of the decision power about issues that affect the collective. The (or a) hierarchical nodes, the hub node, 33 are thus habilitated to undertake strategic decision in representation of the collective (with or without voteby the collective) that become mandatory for members of the collective as long as they belong to it. Strategic networks present features that are specific to hierachies and that provide an additional effectiveness to operate in highly competitive environments [Greve, 2002] . Regulation is the dominant mechanism for contract enforcement.
Using graph tools Greve illustrates the distinction between cooperative and strategic networks as presented in figure 2. A definition of strategic networks [Jarrillo, 1988] , while not framed in the context of TCE, is useful. These networks are long-term, purposeful arrangements among distinct but related for profit organizations that allow those firms in them to gain or sustain competitive advantages vis-à-vis their competitors outside the networkThe differences in the way the decision process is taken in both types of networks necessarily have consequences for governance. We will highlight some of the differences in the context of FC in a later section.
To emphasize the differences between these two models I present below a table summarizing and highlighting these differences:
32 Note that the authors use the term "cooperative" rather than "consensual." We choose to use the latter term to avoid the evident repetition of words that result when applying the concept to cooperative institutions (financial or otherwise). Consensuality is, on the other hand, a key feature of these looser networks.
33 Greve [Greve, 2002] , Polster [Polster, 2001] . 
Horizontal absent or voluntary present and mandatory
This brief schema brings into the forefront the key differences between the two models. The most important difference between the two systems appears to reside in the governance structure. In a consensual networks members of the collective exercise control over the decision process by keeping the right to not adhere to the decisions. Cooperative network pooling and standardization is voluntary and most likely partial as some members opt out for reasons specific to their own situation. In the absence of a collective contract between the second tier nodes and the member nodes of the collective, network services are arranged through bilateral contracts. This arrangement reduces the incentives for the establishment of governance mechanisms that insures contractual solidarity and makes the existence of regulatory bodies responsible for controlling behavior by members of the collective less important.
In strategic networks decisions taken by the collective according to established decision rules become mandatory for the entire collective. This decision process is usually operationalized through the cession by the collective to hierarchical nodes some of the decision power about issues that affect the collective. These nodes are thus empowered to take decision in representation of the collective that thus become mandatory for the collective. This cession of power may be permanent for certain specific and more routine oriented tasks or subject to consultation through the representation bodies (including the general assembly of the collective) in the case of more strategic decisions.. In a strategic network members of the collective exercise control over the decision process not by keeping the right to opt out but by a governance structure that insures that strategic decision making responds to the interest of the members. This through an adequate representation structure that operates under the principle of subsidiarity. In a strategic network once the decision is taken either by democratic vote or by strategic decision making by second tier nodes, compliance becomes mandatory and part of the collective contract. One immediate result is the need to introduce mechanisms to enforce the collective (most likely neo-classical) contract through regulatory bodies.
With the institutional aspect clarified we can now focus on the interpretation of these structures in terms of TCE theory and on the efficiency of both individual nodes and the system as a whole. One aspect to consider when comparing these two forms of networks is their relative position on the economizing frontier. To accomplish this we will use Figure 3 . As noted elsewhere ( [Williamson, 1996] , pp.108-109), as one moves to the right along the governance cost minimizing frontier, the governance mechanisms become increasingly intrusive, leaving less room to autonomous adaptations and increasing the power of cooperative adaptations. This hypothesis thus admits the existence of optimally organized networks that differ in some relevant feature such as the existence or not of strategic nodes. The set of attributes that characterize consensual and strategic networks suggest that the first (N c ) will fall towards the left end of the domain over which networks dominate as governance form. Strategic networks (N s ), on the other hand will fall closer to the intercept of G Hm and G N as they involve considerable large intrusion through the strategic nodes and regulatory bodies. This places strategic networks close to the M-form organization within the group of hierarchical organizations, with which it shares important attributes.
Another aspect to consider is the relative power of both forms of networks to address governance problems that emerge with increasing contractual hazard and size of the enterprise. We cannot avoid draw some additional parallels between strategic networks and the M-form organization. Just as the M-form, strategic networks have the attribute of economizing on bounded rationality and attenuate subgoal pursuit. By separating strategic from operational planning and decision making, strategic networks address directly the cumulative confounding of both functions. Paraphrasing Chandler (cited in Williamson, 1996, pp.. 82 ) the M-form clearly removed the executive responsible for the destiny of the entire enterprise from the more routine operational activity, and so gave them the time, information, and even psychological commitment for long-term planning and appraisal. It is in this sense that strategic networks economize on bounded rationality. The second aspect, attenuation of subgoal pursuit, is even more important. In our context, subgoal pursuit clearly translates into suboptimal allocation of resources. In previous sections we had the opportunity to present in a detailed fashion the role of expense preferences (EP) in FC. To the extent that managers of first-tier nodes focus on operational decision making and strategic nodes on strategic goal setting, performance can easily be assessed independently and subgoal pursuit controlled.
As a group of FC establishes increasingly complex lateral relations, the need to introduce cooperative adaptation mechanisms increases. If, say, the level of contractual hazard resulting from lateral relations is k 1 but the level of governance has not moved from one of classical contract law, then maladaptation and ex-post haggling between participants will cause increases in relation governance costs along the curve G Mm , which, for equal contract hazard will be considerable less efficient than, say, G N , implying the establishment of long term contractual arrangements suitable for cooperative adaptations to consequential disturbances. A system of FC operating under such conditions will operate in a highly inefficient environment which is likely to reflect in low performance both at the individual level and globally. However, even if the system of FC introduces hybrid type of contractual relations, these may or may not produce an efficient result. If the governance mechanism introduced with the network are insufficient to prevent efficient cooperative adaptation, economize in bounded rationality, control subgoal pursuit, the effect may not be optimal. This sort of risk exists if the network structure chosen by the FC is one of consensual nature rather than strategic. In this case, the network may be better-off than in a contractual environment that does no allow for cooperative adaptations, but will be worse-off than another system that has adopted the organizationally more efficient governance mechanism that characterize a strategic network.
Summary of predictions
With purpose of providing an overview of the predictions that can be drawn from the framework presented above, we now present a brief summary of hypothesis that might be tested to verify or reject the propositions. We will also present the approach that will be used for testing these predictions. Two important observations must be made to clarify the approach we will use to perform our testing:
• Mush of the empirical test will be based on measures of efficiency (X-efficiency) that have become standard in analysis of performance of financial intermediaries. X-efficiency is a measure of performance particularly suited to the analysis at hand. In TCE the analysis centers on cost economizing governance mechanisms, however, what matters is the cumulative cost of production and governance costs. The optimal choice is that which minimizes the total cost of production and governance. X-efficiency measures exactly this costs.
• We face the difficult task of finding a suitable proxy of contractual hazard. This is a common problem to empirical research that uses TCE as the framework of analysis. However, throughout the presentation we have argued that contractual hazard and size of institution are positively -albeit imperfectlycorrelated. For this reason we will use size as a proxy of contractual hazard.
The summary of predictions articulated in previous pages is, ceteris paribus:
1. H1: Over ranges of contractual hazard that are very small -i.e. FC that are relatively small and unsophisticated in the services they provide to their members and do not wish to expand those servicesone can expect to see institutions that remain independent or tied up in only very loose arrangement while conserving a relatively high level of efficiency. This is the typical situation of many developing countries in which FC is an incipient sector offering only very basic financial services, which is often all the community they serve needs. Empirically this will be reflected in the fact that over a range of small FC, differences in X-efficiency will be relatively small, if any.
H2:
With less certainty-due to lack of understanding of the mechanisms operating on the upper region of contractual hazard-we adventure to posit that large FC that result from merger processes are the result of the exercise of EP by managers. Thus, these large institutions should display systematically lower X-efficiency that similar sized FC members of networks.
In the case of larger FC created by mergers that resulted from the exercise of EP, these institutions should present governance -and overall-costs, for equal level of contractual hazard, that are superior than those operating in a network regime.
4. H4: FC members of networks should manifest lower exposure to EP. This is so because in networks managers of individual FC are subject to two controls: the one emanating from the membership through the governance bodies (Board of Directors and Supervision/auditing Committees) and the one emanating from the strategic second tier bodies. This proposition can be teste using already developed methodology [Mester, 1991] .
H5:
Strategic networks should display lower variance in the size as well as in performance indicators of FC operating in a particular market.
The statistical model
We propose to verify whether belonging to a network -an alternative mechanism of transaction governancechanges the portrait of the first three alternative measures of performance for individual FC as they grow in size.
The two measures of performance are based on a single standard translog cost function. Since our goal is to test the hypothesis that governance matters rather than to innovate in the technique of efficiency measure, we use a well established approach to measure efficiency. Specifically, we use the intermediation approach, considering the amount of loans as outputs , except for a few modification that we present below but justify as we go. The value of deposits, capital and the number of employees are the inputs. In addition to operational costs, the approach also includes interest costs on the right hand side. The model is based on an work that has become somewhat of a standard in the literature [Sealey and Lindley, 1977] . Since homogeneity of input prices (A ij = 0) was not verified, we include cross-terms. More specifically, our model is inspired from the adaptation for financial intermediaries of the work of Sealey . The modifications are:
• Instead of using cross-sectional estimations, we adopt a distribution-free approach (DFA), a methodology previously used in other studies ( [Berger, 1993] , [Berger and Mester, 1997] , [Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux and Moore, 2001] ).
• We include various dummy variables to form adequate categories, an approach sometimes favored . Following established practice ( [Fried, Lovell and Eeckaut, 1993] , [Hugues and Mester, 1993] , [Rezvanian, Mehdian and Elyasiani, Spring 1996] and [Berger and Mester, 1997] ) we discriminate among five size categories.
• Since we use panel data, we decide upon the estimation procedure (fixed effect or random effect estimators) by performing a Hausman test [Hausman, 1978] . This test is essential when using panel to verify whether parameters should be drawn form a fixed effect estimator (unbiased but inefficient) or a random effect estimator (efficient buy potentially biased if E[X | ².] 6 = 0, that is, if the X matrix of covariates is not independent of individual factors ²).
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• We include a technical efficiency catch-allfactor estimated by a trend variable and its cross-terms with inputs prices and quantities. The approach has become standard in the literature ( [Gallant, 1981] , [Lang and Welzel, 1996b] , [Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux and Moore, 2001] and [Kumbhakar, Lozano-Vivas, Lovell and Hassan, 2001] ).
• We do not include cost share equations, to reflect the fact that FC are not assumed to minimize their costs as a joint stock bank would. This is consistent with the study of German cooperative banks [Lang and Welzel, 1996b] .
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• Due to differences in definition of loan products in both systems, we focus on product specific economies of scale for all loan products grouped into a single category. While it might have been desirable to introduce more than one output, we do not see this as a weakness of the study. Loans, in its different forms, is one of the two main products that characterize the service of a FC to its members. The other, savings products, was used as an input in order to respect the intermediation approach to EOS studies that was considered as more suitable in the present context than the production approach to EOS. For this reason the study can be viewed as based on a loans specific EOS approach.
The model is defined as follows:
34 If independence is verified the appropiate estimation procedure is one of random effect, and if it is not, the use of fixed effect estimation procedures becomes imperative to avoid bias in the key coefficients. This procedure was apparently not followed by some earlier research that made use of the random effect procedure ( [Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux and Moore, 2001] ). Other [Lang and Welzel, 1996a] present results for both fixed and random effect estimators but do not indicate which is the unbiased vector. As shown [Hausman, 1978] , only one set of estimators is adequate for a specific sample, with one of them either inefficient, or biased. 35 We note however that various authors imposed cost minimization for non-profit financial intermediaries ([Murray J.D., 1983] , [Rezvanian, Mehdian and Elyasiani, Spring 1996] and ).
Where α 0 = a constant. b = a vector of coefficients. x = a matrix of variables including 3 non-scaled log-input prices, 3 non-scaled log-input quantities, 1 non-scaled log-output quantity, 1 trend variable to reflect technological changes, log of credit risk, log of capitalization, and a dummy for acquiring institutions. As noted, we also include nine dummy variables to separate into five size groups for each country, with the smallest Quebec FC representing the intercept. Table II presents the definition and basic characteristics of the variables. Note that CRR, CAP, and ACQ variables are not included in cross analyses. Fourier Flexible terms require scaled variables comprised within [0,2π] range. Table III presents the basic characteristics of our scaled variables and scaling factors. The scaling process is consistent with earlier work [Mitchell, May 1996] . A = [A w1 , A w2 , A w3 , A x1 , A x2 , A x3 , A y , A T , GR1, ..., GR9], a matrix of 90 coefficients most of which are related to cross terms. ² = individual efficiency component of error ε = random error. The usual constraints to insure homogeneity in input prices and symmetry of second-order coefficients are imposed:
Besides these restrictions we also assure that trigonometric terms including input prices respect the condition P k h = 0 ( [Gallant, 1982] , [Mitchell, May 1996] ). As detailed in Table II , the dependent variable is total costs, including both operational expenses and interest expenses. The independent variables include three inputs and their respective prices : Interest rate on deposits, cost of personnel, and cost of fixed capital. We include only one output, the quantity of loans. All these variables are unscaled.
A technical change variable is estimated by the trend variable. We will further detail this concept in the following section. We also integrated an ex post risk measure: the proportion of bad loans over net loans and the amount of capital over assets. Evidence exists that the larger the capital, the larger the EOS ( [Hugues and Mester, 1993] , [Hugues and Mester, 1998] ). This variable control for heteroschedasticity and potential differences between well and poorly capitalized FC. In effect, strong evidence ( [Hugues and Mester, 1993] , [Mester, 1993] , [Hugues, Lang, Mester and Moon, 1996] , and [Berger and Mester, 1997] ) support inclusion of capital into cost efficiency. A small cooperative does not have access to the same amount of deposits due to a lesser capital. Larger FC have more possibilities to generate profits because they already accumulated some reserves over time that give them more flexibility in their asset-management. A study with a data set consisting of 441 bank holding companies demonstrated that inclusion of capital structure and risktaking into efficiency measurement improves the estimated coefficients [Hugues, Mester and Moon, 2000] , two variables also included elsewhere [Hugues and Mester, 1993] .
We use an unbalanced panel data set over the years 1996-2000 (described below) including merging institutions in Quebec. We consider both pre-merger institutions as independent FC, and post-merger institution as a different institution. We use a different U.S. paired-FC after merger, and include a dummy variable taking a value of 1 when the merger occurs. This approach follows established practice ( [Lang and Welzel, 1996b] , [Lang and Welzel, 1999] ). Then we include a set of dummy variables to distinguish among various groups of FC. We divided the sample into five size groups in terms of asset values: <5.0 millions; 5-10 millions; 10-25 millions; 25-50 millions and, last group, >50 millions. Thus, the intercept represents U.S. FC with assets <5.0 millions, the first dummy includes U.S. FC with real assets between 5 and 10 millions, the second one between 10 and 25 millions, the third between 25 and 50 millions, while the fourth includes the ones above 50 millions. The fifth to ninth dummies includes Canadian FC whose assets are distributed among similar size groups. More precisely, the fifth includes FC whose assets are below 5 millions, while the ninth group includes Canadian FC whose assets are above 50 millions. The groups were recomposed each year to control for migration due to natural growth or merger. Through the use of size and country dummies we have estimated unrestricted models that are specific to each country and group size.
The last section of our model (presented by expression F F ) is related to Fourrier transform terms. They are trigonometric modifications of scaled variables included in the function (3 inputs, 3 input prices, and 1 output). This process enables the cost function to better fit data than the Translog cost function eliminating some of the assumptions of parametric models, as we will discuss in the following section. Next sections present some aspects of performance measurement, the FF terms and error decomposition, respectively.
The error term is divided into an inefficiency (²) and a random (ε) component. The first component is the core (or individual mean) inefficiency, estimated as the time average of each FC's residual, while the second component is the purely random component.
Measures of Performance
We now present technical details about the two performance measures. We consider X-efficiency as an indicator of performance. Our definition of efficiency [Berger and Mester, 1997] is:
Where ²
Min i
is the minimal cost associated to the most efficient CU, approximated by the 1% fractile of our sample in order to avoid extreme observations. The interpretation of the ratio is that it represents the proportion of costs that is efficiently used. For example, if ² Min i is representing 70% of ² i , 70% of costs of this FC is used efficiently, and 30% is wasted inefficiently. All FC having a cost below the 1% fractile receive a 100% efficiency score.
Fourier Flexible Functional Form
In order to be coherent with some recent critics of the translog cost function for efficiency measurement ( [Mitchell, May 1996] , [Berger and Mester, 1997] ), we decide to estimate a model that integrates trigonometric independent variables. The translog specification imposes a U-shaped cost function that might not be the adequate form of the cost structure. Fourier Flexible (FF) functional form permits to estimate the bias introduced by traditional translog cost function [Mitchell, May 1996] . In effect, assuming that the true cost function of the credit unions follows a translog function might introduce a bias if this is not actually the case. The superiority of the FF functional form has been amply demonstrated ( [Gallant, 1981] , [Gallant, 1982] , [Mitchell, May 1996] , [Berger, Leusner and Mingo, 1997] ) by performing exclusion tests on the FF terms. Efficiency ranking is not much affected by the inclusion of FF terms, though each coefficient taken separately was significant [Berger and DeYoung, 1997] . Some authors found that inefficiencies were twice as big when excluding the FF terms [Berger and DeYoung, 1997] . The choice of trigonometric terms was inspired from earlier studies ( [Mitchell, May 1996] and [Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux and Moore, 2001] ). Like previous works ( [Mitchell, May 1996] [Berger and Mester, 1997] ) we test the impact of adding FF terms by estimating the significance of their associated coefficients. We also perform additional exclusion tests as done in previous studies mentioned above. The set of trigonometric terms selected and exclusion tests are presented in Table  III .
Panel Data Set and Error Decomposition
A critical assumption associated to stochastic frontier approaches (SFA) models is that the error term can be decomposed into a random component, following a normal distribution, and an efficiency component, following a half-normal distribution. Many alternatives were proposed to avoid this critical assumption, as the hypothesis of half-normal distribution of the efficiency component received some critics recently ( [Greene, 1990] and [Berger, 1993] ). We concentrate on three alternatives: The first consists in eliminating the random component of the error term altogether, using a non-parametric model such as DEA or FDH. As we previously mentioned, DEA avoids the decomposition of errors between efficiency and randomness by assuming that the random component is simply not present and that differences in total costs are completely explained by differences in efficiency ( [Aly, Grabowski, Pasurka and Rangan, 1990] , [Ferrier and Lovell, 1990] , [Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1990] ).
The second alternative is to set an arbitrary limit between random error and efficiency, with a methodology such as the TFA [Lozano Vivas, 1997] . This methodology assumes that deviations from predicted costs within the lowest average-cost quartile are attributable to random error, while deviations in the remaining quartiles are attributable to efficiency. TFA only substitutes the assumption about the distribution of the error term with an equally arbitrary assumption about where the inefficiencies stop and the random errors begin [Berger, 1993] . Important divergences in the results were noted from one methodology to another. This inconsistency prompted some critics to both approaches:
Berger and Humphrey attribute the inconsistent ranking to the major sinsof these two approaches -viz., too little account of random error by the non-parametric studies and too much structure imposed on the frontier by the parametric approaches. [?] The third alternative is to consider a random error component, but to eliminate all the distributional constraints by introducing a panel data set. Several authors have noted the virtues of DFA estimates obtained with a panel data set ( [Schmidt and Sickles, 1984] , [Berger, 1993] , [Berger and Mester, 1997] , [Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux and Moore, 2001] ). A methodology was established to evaluate the most adequate number of years to consider, with data covering 618 U.S. commercial banks over eleven (11) years . De Young found that a six (6) years period is the best compromise between too little (which introduces a large dispersion or residuals) and too much time periods (which is delicate if some tendency is included in the data).
Concretely, our method consists in estimating average individual inefficiency over the five year period. This constitutes the non-random component (²) of error, or average inefficiency. This measure is compared to the level of inefficiency of most efficient FC over the five-years period, which eliminates short term randomness. As suggested in Hausman [Hausman, 1978] , we test whether a random or a fixed effect model is more appropriate with a Chi-square test comparing the vector of coefficient estimated with both models.
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Data
We consider an unbalanced panel data set of 306 Ontario credit unions (CU) paired with equal number of Quebec caisses populaires (caisses), yielding a total of 1530 observations between 1996 and 2000. The smallest 126 OCU do not have a match in size in the DM, thus they were excluded from the sample. They were excluded when they were smaller than 88% of the value of the smallest caisse. The characteristics of the remaining samples are presented in Table I . We observe that Quebec's caisses have somewhat larger median of assets than their Ontario's counterparts despite the size matching done at the beginning of the sample period. This is so because the caisses have grown faster than the CU. Including remaining Caisses from Quebec into our sample would increase the median figure of total assets by near 40%.
The pairing was performed as follows. The sample for Quebec is larger than that for Ontario's, thus we found one caisse for each Ontario credit union whose assets were most similar as of December 1996. We keep the initial matching throughout study period and provide no substitute for exiting observations -most due to the recent merger wave in Quebec. A test of difference of means for the two pairs samples (Z-test) yields size is not statistically different. More precisely, computing the difference in size for each pair yields that in 232 pairs the difference is less than half a percent, in 47 pairs it is between 0,5% and 2,5%, in 14 pairs between 2,5% and 5%, and in only 13 pairs is the difference more than 5%. In more than 95% of our pairs the difference is less than 5% of asset value.
We insured poolability of data first by controlling for time trend. Our second control for poolability consists in estimating Equation 1 excluding and then including GR1,...,GR9 (size) and country dummy variables and test for the importance of residual individual and time effect present in the error by means of an ANOVA, a common approach with panel data. The inclusion of size dummies and all FF terms significantly reduced the F-statistics of both effects (time and individual) but they remains significant. This suggests the presence of latent individual and time effects that are correlated with the included explanatory variables. After demeaning the series to eliminate the individual based latent effects we performed yet another ANOVA on the error term and found no residual time effect. To correct problems of serial correlation -manifested in a DW of only 1.51-we included an autoregressive term, thus loosing one entire year of observations. The final estimation yielded a DW of 1.98 within acceptable range. Then we performed a Hausman specification test to check whether the fixed or the random effect estimation procedure is the correct one. The random effect estimation procedure was also estimated using an autoregression term. The Hausman test yielded a very high Chi-square significant at least at the 1% level. This suggests that using a random effect estimation procedure, although more efficient, would yield biased coefficients. As Westley and Shaffer and other authors referenced therein, we added a scalar to total costs (10000) when we estimated our regressions. Since the typical regression generates about 290 coefficients, we do not present these estimates. Table I shows that Quebec caisses and size-paired Ontario CU have similar clienteles, i.e. have comparable median size of loans and deposits. However smaller CU concentrate on much smaller transactions than their counterparts in Quebec. The median loan per employee of the smallest CU is $554, almost half the 1021$ of the caisses. Despite their almost identical size and similar clientele, Ontario's CU display a substantially greater ratio of loans to administrative expenses. In effect, the ratio varies between 140 and 253 for CU, and between 27 and 44 for the caisses. This can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that Ontario CU rely considerably on volunteer workers to run the institutions. As Table II reveals the average real wage rate, in thousands by equivalent full-time employee-deflated by the CPI-is almost 10 times larger in the caisses than in the CU. In terms of assets, wages are o.29% and 1.79% for Ontario and Quebec respectively. This means that for each $100 of assets the caisses pay six times more in wages than a CU. The ratio can be as small as 0.0% (all volunteer-run CU) in Ontario. More interestingly, smaller CU appear to be more efficient than larger ones, as the ratio of loans over administrative costs declines with increase in asset size, contrary to the behavior observed in the caisses and to common argument of scale economies. In other words, large Ontario CU do not perform better operationally than their smaller counterparts while the opposite happens in Quebec. This could be due to the fact that larger CU may rely less on volunteer workers but is also consistent with the argument that networks tend to better control subgoal pursuit in large FC.
Results
The intermediation margin is, in the context of a FC, the ultimate measure of cost facing members (borrowers and savers) that includes both production and transaction governance costs. The smaller this margin, the higher (lower) will be the rates that FC will pay (charge) to its net saver (borrower) members. This margin must cover all other expenses incurred by the FC. Except for the smaller units, this intermediation margin is smaller for CU than for caisses. Given the 10 times lower personnel costs of the CU this is not a too surprising result. Further the savings in personnel costs compared to the caisses are evidently passed on to members.
37 This preliminary results suggest that efficiency test should yield a clear advantage for the CU over the caisses. This would support the hypothesis often advanced that the average cost of running the Quebec complex network is higher than the cost or running a system of non-integrated FC. We will see that despite the important difference in labor costs, this is not the case.
The first sign of an important weakness in the Ontario system is suggested by the ratio of deposits over loans. It is substantially higher for Ontario than for Quebec FC. In the banking literature this is a measure of credit risk exposure, but in the context of FC it may reflect the use of member funds for unproductive purposes such as fixed asset. This is a measure of funds acquired from members that are not used for financial intermediation-production of loans-but might rather be wasted in inefficient operations such as maintaining luxury offices, cars for managers, etc.
38 This is confirmed by the Fixed-to-Total Assets ratio, that starts smaller for Ontario than Quebec but becomes equal or larger for all size-groups larger than 3.0 million in assets.
To settle some of these contradictory evidences, we use more formal measures of performance that have become standard in financial intermediation literature. For this we make use of the concepts of X-efficiency 37 The fact that the intermediation magin is lower in Quebec than Ontario for the smallest FC may be explained by the process of cross-subsidization between caisses that impose a greater intermediation margin on members of medium and large institutions to subsidize small, urban FC. Also it should be remembered that Quebec's caisses have a larger presence in rural areas, characterized by greater intermediation costs.
38 The ratio can be associated to Jensen's [Jensen, 1986] Free Cash Flow (FCF) theory stating that the larger the FCF, the greater the incentives to incur into agency costs.
(EFF), and technical efficiency (TEC). We present results of estimation related to Equations ?? to ?? in Panels A to C of Table IV, respectively. Before entering into details, some comments about our main hypotheses (FIX):
1. Over a range of small FC, differences in X-efficiency will be relatively small, if any. We find no difference in X-efficiency between Ontario and Quebec FC.
2. Large institutions should display systematically lower X-efficiency that similar sized FC members of networks. We find that larger Ontario FC are systematically less efficient than equivalent Quebec FC.
3. In the case of larger FC created by mergers that resulted from the exercise of EP, these institutions should present governance -and overall-costs, for equal level of contractual hazard, that are superior than those operating in a network regime. This hypothesis was not tested but results obtained for larger FC (merged or not) the hypothesis is supported by the data.
4. FC members of networks should manifest lower exposure to EP. This proposition was not tested.
5. Strategic networks should display lower variance in the size as well as in performance indicators of FC operating in a particular market. Hypothesis is supported by the data. Now the details. Let us start with the last hipothesis. As Panel C of Table IV shows, the whole OCU system presents a standard deviation of asset size more than twice that of the DM for about a similar mean. To note is also that although the mean size of the OCU institution is larger than that the caisses, the median of the first is much smaller than that of the second. This means that while there are a few very large CU most of them are very small. X-efficiency is about the same if the unadjusted measure is used (i.e. if we ignore any systematic differences in efficiency) but larger and with lower variance for the Quebec system if the adjusted measure is used. The upper left stochastic dominance diagram that represents the complete system supports the same idea. There, Quebec (in red) dominates Ontario (in blue) in first order stochastic dominance. Thus, H5 is unambiguously supported by the data.
X-efficiency
With respect to H1 and H2. These hypothesis propose that over a range of small FC, differences in Xefficiency will be relatively small, if any, and that larger Quebec FC should be more efficient than the equivalent sized Ontario FC. Panel A and B of Table IV presents mean individual X-efficiency scores in their usual presentation (Panel A) and adjusted (Panel B). In Panel B Quebec FC present X-efficiency scores between 86.7% (the smallest FC by assets) and 90.1% (the largest FC), while Ontario CU the efficiency scores go from 81.2% (the largest FC) to 88.4% (the second smallest group of FC).What is of interest is that while the X-efficiency of the caisses stays relatively stable or increases with size, in the case of the CU, there is a net fall in X-efficiency. For small FC the difference in efficiency scores is nearly absent, with the Ontario FC even presenting some advantage. However, the difference in efficiency increases with size of the institution in favor of Quebec. The same pattern can be observed by inspecting the stochastic dominance graphs. In the first three size-groups no system first order stochastically dominates the other. However the larger variance of efficiency measures (Hypothesis 1) results in a pattern in which Quebec starts to dominate in the lower range of the size group and, after the crossing of the curves, Ontario dominates. To see which system dominates, one would need to compute second order dominance graphs. For the two largest groups, Quebec dominates unambiguously Ontario in terms of efficiency scores. We also produced a diagram that plots the difference is efficiency scores after ordering the institutions by size. This plot is presented in Figure 5 . while barely noticeable there is a positive relationship between size and difference in X-efficiency (EF F Q − EF F O ). What is important, however, is that all larger Ontario FC fall on the positive quadrant of the graph. That is, larger Ontario FC display systematically lower efficiency scores than Quebec FC of similar size. Throughout, these results are consistent with our central theoretical proposition that strategic networks provide a substitute, hierarchy based, control mechanisms when size of the institution dilutes internal governance mechanisms thus discouraging subgoal pursuits and expense preferences, and possibly economizing on bounded rationality. Thus, both hypothesis are supported by the data. H3 was not tested directly, however, it is evident that larger FC in Ontario-some resulting from mergers-are the one displaying the largest differences in X-efficiency with respect to their Quebec counterpart.
While the measures in efficiency suggest that smaller FC of both systems are similarly equivalent, this numbers hide three important fact: i) that even the smallest caisses offer to its members a much larger range of financial services and products than even some of the larger Ontario CU; ii) That the DM has a much larger presence in rural communities than the OCU, a key measure of outreach that accompanies necessarily a loss in efficiency. iii) The DM has succeeded in extending its services to nearly 42% of the lower income population of Quebec-often rationed by the commercial banking system-with a range of essential financial products that compares favorably with that offered by the banks. To investigate the source of inefficiency in both system we regressed the measures of efficiency against a set of correlates, including measures of outreach and service (proportion of FC in rural communities, average size of transaction, number of member per office), expense preference (size of institution, fixed assets over total assets) and measures of risk (past due loans and leverage).
39 The results are presented in Table V . Being a rural FC impacts negatively and significantly efficiency. Given the relatively large proportion of rural institutions in the DM (51.3%) compared to that of the OCU system (38.5%)-see Table 2 -it is perhaps not surprising that the caisses with less than 3 MM of assets underperform the CU of the same size. This rural presence is cross-subsidized by the rest of the system. The median loan per member, another measure of outreach, is not significant in either system. In terms of expense preference, size is negatively related to efficiency in Quebec and, somewhat surprisingly, unrelated to efficiency in Ontario. Leverage is a significant factor for efficiency in OCU but has no effect on Quebec caisses. Finally, credit risk is unrelated to efficiency in both systems. It is sometimes argued that running the Desjardins' strategic network system is expensive. Thus that the benefits noted before come at a heavy price. The data suggests that, yes, the success of the DM is servicing its vast and rural clientele comes at a price. But, even paying that price, the evidence provided by the measures of X-efficiency indicates that the DM outperforms the OCU system.
Conclusions
This paper presents a study of the economic organization of systems of financial cooperatives (FC). It consists of two parts. The first part presents a theoretical framework rooted in principles of transaction cost economics (TCE) that seeks to explain empirical regularities observable in systems of FC worldwide. In particular we seek to explain integration of large numbers of FC into large networks that present specific features common to many countries. The second part consists of an empirical study that compares two systems of FC, the Quebec Desjardins movement (DM) and the Ontario Credit Union system (OCU) that are both organized as networks but whose development has reached different levels of complexity.
The fundamental proposition is that networks, particularly strategic networks, are a superior form of governance mechanism (over markets and mergers) for relatively wide and relevant ranges of contractual hazard and size of the institutions. Another central theoretical proposition generated by the analysis is that strategic networks provide a substitute, hierarchy based, control mechanisms when size of the institution dilutes internal governance mechanisms thus discouraging subgoal pursuits and expense preferences, and possibly economizing on bounded rationality both occurring in large FC-and became so by internal growth or merger. The theoretical portion allows us to generate a set of testable hypothesis that can be formulated as follows: i) Over a range of small FC, differences in efficiency will be relatively small, if any. The reason is that lower contractual hazard reduces the need to engage in complex lateral neo-classical type of contractual arrangements. ii) Large institutions should display systematically lower efficiency that similar sized FC members of strategic networks. This is so because the hierarchy present in a strategic networks provides a substitute, hierarchy based, control mechanisms when size of the institution dilutes internal governance mechanisms thus discouraging subgoal pursuits and expense preferences. iii) In the case of larger FC created by mergers that resulted from the exercise of EP, these institutions should present governance -and overallcosts, for equal level of contractual hazard, that are superior than those operating in a network regime. iv) 39 Here again we checked through an ANOVA for the presence of latent individual and time effects. Their presence can be expected since they where reincorporated in the scores when computing the adjusted efficiency measure. The presence of both effects was verifid at highly significant levels. Thus, the regression of correlates was estimated using a fixed effect error decomposition controling for both individual and time effects. We also computed the correlation matrix of correlates. The largest ρ took the absolute value of only 0.25.
FC members of networks should manifest lower exposure to EP. v) Strategic networks should display lower variance in the size as well as in performance indicators of FC operating in a particular market. This is so because networks discourage the creation of large institutions by limiting subgoal pursuit and solving, though an alternative mechanism, problems of uncertainty and economies of scale and scope in input acquisition.
In the empirical portion of the paper we tested hypothesis i, ii and v (and indirectly iii). Throughout the data support the hypothesis derived from the theoretical framework. We find that small Ontario and Quebec based FC display essentially the same level of efficiency, albeit this can be explained by the considerably larger presence of the Desjardins movement in rural communities. Large Ontario FC, on the other hand, are considerably less efficient than Quebec FC of similar size. Finally, the variability of size and X-efficiency of Ontario FC is larger than that of Quebec FC.
Throughout, these results are consistent with our central theoretical proposition that strategic networks provide a substitute, hierarchy based, control mechanisms when size of the institution dilutes internal governance mechanisms thus discouraging subgoal pursuits and expense preferences, and possibly economizing on bounded rationality. Opponents to networks often argued that running the Desjardins' strategic network system is expensive. Thus that the benefits associated to the vast array of financial services offered to large sectors of the population and in particular to rural communities comes at a heavy price. The data suggest that, yes, the success of the DM is servicing its vast and rural clientele comes at a price. But, even paying that price, the evidence provided by the measures of X-efficiency indicates that the DM outperforms the OCU system. These characteristics bring lower efficiency by employee, although if one compares the amount of loans over administrative costs it seems that Ontario's credit unions are much more efficient, with a ratio almost ten times greater for small cooperatives. This result, coupled with a lower intermediation margin of Ontario's credit unions, can be explained by the important use of unpaid employees in Ontario's credit unions. We will detail these aspects in Table II .
Number of Observations
47 14
Note: In Panels A and B we observe that Quebec's Caisses grew more rapidly than their Ontario's counterparts. In effect, despite almost perfect matching of size in December 1996 (as can be seen in Panel C and D, where we show that 232 of the 306 observations are different by less than 0,5% and that differences of more than 12% were rejected, as well as all Ontario's credit unions whose size was below 88% of the smallest caisse of Quebec, eliminating 126 observations), the proportion of Ontario's credit unions staying below 3 millions dolars is more than twice that of Quebec's Caisses. This phenomenon is explained by the important merger process completed in Quebec in the last few years. We also note that median operations of Ontario's credit unions are much smaller than operations in Quebec. Table II (1) To avoid extreme observations, we had to limit the interest rate on deposits at 24%, which is the usurary rate in Canada.
Symbol
Quebec Ontario
Definition of variables and their basic characteristics (1) This figure presents first order stochastid dominance (SD) diagrams. The first diagram uses data over the whole range of sizes. The remaining five present SD diagrams for each of the size groups used in the empirical test procedures. 
